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Introduction 
This chapter examines participation spaces in peri-urban Luanda, Angola – a context 
very different from those that have originated most recent studies in this field and 
which presents a series of apparently highly adverse conditions for the development 
of citizen participation. Sometimes labelled a ‘fragile’ or ‘failed’ state, Angola could 
more correctly be described as a state that is failing its people. It has a tradition of 
centralised and authoritarian rule stretching back through decades of single-party 
government and civil war to the centuries of Portuguese domination and 
colonisation. This tradition has remained powerful despite the shift towards 
economic liberalisation and formal multi-party democracy since 1991. Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s second-largest oil producer, with a GDP per capita 29 percent above the 
continent’s average, Angola’s Human Development Index is nevertheless among the 
worst in the world, with the country rated 166th out of 177 nations (UNDP 2004).2 
With the end of the civil war in 2002, attention has begun to shift to the role of 
governance issues in perpetuating this situation, and in particular the link between 
limited participation and accountability and lack of social justice.  
This chapter argues, however, that significant ‘invisible’ processes of democratisation 
may be underway – including the emergence of new leaders at the local level and 
 shifts in citizens’ expectations of their interactions with government. It examines the 
role of NGO-sponsored participation processes in contributing to this trend in the 
capital, Luanda, through case studies drawn from the Luanda Urban Poverty 
Programme (LUPP). The analysis argues that while the ‘invited spaces’ created by 
these NGOs may begin as conventional participation-in-development models, in the 
particular social and political context of Luanda they mutate into other forms of 
participation. These forms reflect the interests, agency and strategies of local actors, 
their encounters with and adaptation to a changing context, and the release of 
repressed political energy which follows the opening up of new participation spaces 
in a setting long characterised by lack of responsiveness. The chapter concludes by 
examining the challenges for NGOs promoting new participation spaces in contexts 
like Luanda, and the potential wider application of the lessons learned. In particular, 
it argues that there is a need to pay greater attention to the accountability 
implications of new spaces if the emerging leadership that they foster is not simply 
to reproduce the authoritarian practices of the old, while recognising that even when 
it has autocratic or elitist elements, this leadership may still play an essential part in 
steps towards broader participation. 
New democratic spaces in adverse contexts 
Recent writing on citizenship and participation has increasingly come to focus on the 
arenas within which new social and political relations are constructed. Some of these 
‘new democratic spaces’ (Cornwall 2004) have been described as sites of ‘deliberative 
democracy’ or even ‘empowered participatory governance’ (Fung and Wright 2003), 
 where the exercise of reasoned debate between political equals in public space leads 
to the emergence of consensus and binding decisions. In the development field, there 
has been a proliferation of participation spaces, often as a result of pressure from 
multilateral, bilateral or non-governmental development agencies for whom the 
setting up of user committees or stakeholder fora has become the default means of 
signalling commitment to participation, citizenship and accountability. At the same 
time, governance innovations developed in particular parts of the global ‘South’, 
such as Participatory Budgeting or citizen report cards, are being exported both 
elsewhere in the ‘South’ and to parts of the ‘North’. Thus, institutions and practices 
originating from particular sets of conditions are increasingly appearing in radically 
different settings, many of which are unpromising or even highly adverse. 
Most discussions of the new democratic spaces have focused on the conditions that 
enable their success, with authors variously emphasising strong associative 
networks, low levels of inequality, social traditions of conflict resolution through 
public debate, enabling legal frameworks and pro-poor political parties. While some 
studies have examined the implications of unfavourable contextual factors and the 
role of different enabling conditions in overcoming them,3 few have attempted an 
examination of the nature and potential of participatory spaces in settings where few 
or even none of these conditions are present. Potentially adverse settings include 
countries and regions with fragmented societies, high levels of inequality, restrictive 
legal frameworks, a highly authoritarian political culture and a history of armed 
conflict. All of these conditions apply to Angola.  
 In such settings, it is common to find the (often unspoken but nonetheless powerful) 
assumption that the micro-level changes that may lead to ‘empowered participatory 
governance’ are not even worth looking for, since local-level participation is largely 
meaningless without governance reforms focusing on macro-level political 
institutions. As a country emerging from one of the world’s longest-running and 
most destructive civil wars, Angola is a prime target for what Llamazares calls the 
‘emerging consensus’ of the ‘growing international post-war peacebuilding 
community’, according to whose prescriptions ‘the political-constitutional deficit 
during the initial phase is addressed by transitional governing measures, in the 
medium term by the organising of a crucial second election, and finally the 
consolidation of good governance and civil society’ (2005: 15). Thus, micro-level 
democratisation is relegated in the dominant peace-building discourse to the ‘final’ 
stage of democratic reconstruction, leading to neglect of the potentially vital 
contribution which it may make to ensuring the depth and durability of the 
transition to peace. 
This discourse contrasts with the evidence that donor-sponsored proliferation of 
participation spaces is increasingly extending to post-conflict societies such as 
Angola. Although humanitarian relief, demobilisation support and infrastructure-
rehabilitation assistance continue to dominate aid portfolios in Angola, donor 
interventions to promote the consolidation of good governance and civil society have 
mushroomed since the end of the war. This shift has occurred despite the fact that 
the transitional governing measures and elections prescribed by the dominant peace-
building discourse are either absent or uncertain.4 The new spaces, which include 
 networks of groups mobilised for collective action and fora for citizen-state 
engagement, are thus emerging in a context where the democratic ‘rules of the game’ 
have yet to be clearly established. This lack of clarity is a common feature of 
countries in post-conflict and/or post-authoritarian transition, but it is one whose 
implications are often given insufficient consideration by both academics and 
donors. 
Donor ‘democracy-building’ interventions in Angola have largely followed the logic 
described for Africa in general by Robinson and Friedman (2005), who draw 
attention to the shift in priorities since the 1990s from political conditionality based 
on elections towards investment in civil society as a catalyst of democratisation. The 
World Bank, for example, describes one of the aims of its funding for the Fundo de 
Apoio Social (FAS) social fund programme as being ‘to support a governance system 
in which local governments and communities may gradually become mutually 
accountable’ (World Bank 2004: 1) and the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) Angola strategy aims to promote ‘a political system which 
allows all people to influence state policy and practice’ by supporting ‘spaces for 
dialogue’ and ‘state citizen engagement’ (Jobes 2004: 2). Donors are thus promoting 
both citizen mobilisation and new democratic spaces in Angola in terms that are 
virtually identical to those used in far less adverse contexts.  
In addition to institutional fluidity and lack of clarity on the democratic ‘rules of the 
game’, a further factor of transitional contexts such as Angola’s is the identities of the 
institutions that are actually creating ‘new democratic spaces’. While the shift in 
discourse in recent years towards a focus on participation in governance rather than 
 participation in projects (Gaventa and Valderrama 1999) has generated an 
assumption that today’s participation spaces are created by governments rather than 
NGOs, it is important to remember that where government has been unable or 
unwilling to introduce the necessary reforms, NGOs continue to play a key role in 
the creation of participation spaces. While some NGOs have an explicit ‘participatory 
governance’ agenda, others may view these spaces above all as sites for the 
mobilisation of local resources for service provision. Even where this is the case, 
some of the spaces created can come to play a governance role – and thus have wider 
political significance – despite their origins outside conventional governance-reform 
processes.  
The nature of this role, and its precise implications for processes of democratisation, 
will ultimately be shaped by the complex interplay between the interests and 
agendas of government, donors, NGOs and citizen groups both at the policy level 
and on the ground. The scope for agency is broadest where the balance of power 
does not overwhelmingly favour one group; at the national level in Angola, for 
example, while oil and diamond revenues ensure that the government is far less 
donor-dependent than those of many other poor African states, the need for donors’ 
support in accessing international credit markets ensures that it is not completely 
insulated from the pressure they may seek to apply (DFID 2005a: 15). At the 
grassroots level, international NGOs’ ability to mobilise financial and technical 
resources interacts with the political power of local government representatives and 
the capacity of citizens to exploit new opportunities to further their individual or 
collective political and livelihood strategies. This capacity for agency on the part of 
 some grassroots actors is further increased when the context – as in Angola – is one 
of unclear and shifting institutional roles and rules.  
Angola: a changing social and political context 
Recent and uncertain democracy  
The history of the state in Angola has been marked by strong control over society, 
centralisation and authoritarian practices. After a long period of colonial rule by 
Portugal, which had itself been ruled by a dictatorship since 1926, Independence was 
proclaimed in 1975 by the Movimento Popular pela Libertação de Angola (MPLA), one of 
the three Angolan liberation movements. This political movement was influenced by 
Marxist-Leninist ideals and founded a strong one-party state, which was highly 
centralised and made no allowance for autonomy on the part of organized social 
groups and political organizations.  
Although the periods just before and after Independence saw the emergence and 
significant activity of different civic and political organizations, the Angolan 
Government gradually imposed control over this social space (Pestana 2003). The 
need for a strong state was justified by the government and perceived by part of 
society as necessary to confront increasing threats, both external, related to the cold 
war at the time and the political geography of Southern Africa,5 and internal, linked 
mostly to conflicting political visions and ideologies of Angolan political elites 
(Hodges 2002). 6 With the exception of brief periods of peace just after Independence 
and following peace agreements in the 1990s, Angola lived at war until 2002. 
 In 1991, with the end of the cold war, under the weight of a growing economic crisis 
and following the signature of the Bicesse Peace Agreement with União Nacional para 
a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), the Angolan Government abandoned all 
references to Marxist-Leninist ideology and changed the country’s constitution, 
allowing for the institution of a multiparty political system and a formally 
democratic state. These changes allowed multiparty elections to be held in 1992, but 
after UNITA refused to accept the outcome of these elections, civil war broke out 
again. The war ended in 2002 with the military defeat of UNITA. As no other 
political force emerged during the 1990s there is currently no real opposition to the 
MPLA. 
While the current strong position of the MPLA would allow those in power to 
maintain the political status quo, it is undeniable that Angola is changing. Strategies 
are being developed for macroeconomic recovery and infrastructure reconstruction, 
a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) has been produced, and legislation has 
been passed to provide for national parliamentary and presidential elections in 2006. 
New policy frameworks are being discussed, albeit largely within a closed circle of 
policy makers. These include provision for the decentralisation of state 
administration, which could potentially play a crucial role in legitimating and 
institutionalising new democratic spaces at the local level. However, the current 
decentralisation process has for the moment only reached provincial level, where it 
has led to greater concentration of power in the hands of Provincial Governors, who 
thus have scope to behave as ‘decentralised despots’ (cf. Mamdani 1996). The final 
shape of provisions for decentralisation to the municipal and comuna (sub-municipal) 
 level remains unclear, but the government’s formal recognition that such provisions 
are on its agenda has created political space for experimentation with local 
participation initiatives in a number of municipalities around the country.7  
At the same time, the easing of political repression and media censorship – above all 
in the capital, Luanda – has increased the scope for civic associations’ advocacy 
initiatives and the visibility of alternative perspectives on policy issues. Ordinary 
Angolans are making plans to (re)build their lives, and new actors are beginning to 
emerge, mobilising local and donor resources for service provision and occupying 
the emerging spaces outside the institutions of ‘formal democracy’ that provide some 
opportunities for citizen voice and the beginnings of democratic debate. 
Luanda: between the modern capital and the musseques 
The population of Luanda has grown hugely since Independence, as a result of 
migration linked to the return of Angolan refugees from the former Zaire (now 
Democratic Republic of Congo), the collapse of the rural economy, and the war. Most 
of these new residents settled in the peri-urban areas, increasing the population 
density of Luanda’s musseques, the informal settlements surrounding the formal 
‘cement city’ and occupied by the poorer inhabitants of the capital. No one really 
knows how many people live in the city, but current estimates suggest a total 
population of over 4 million, between two-thirds and three-quarters of whom may 
live in the musseques. This population growth has not been accompanied by 
expansion of the supply of public services, leaving most musseque residents largely 
dependent on self-provisioning. The pressures faced by poor households are 
 enormous, and given the decline in the formal private sector and the low salaries in 
the public sector, most households depend on the informal sector to survive.  
The consequences of many years of neglect and little or no investment are evident 
even in the ‘cement city’: it has crumbling infrastructure, bad roads and piles of 
uncollected rubbish. After the end of the war, the authorities seem to have decided 
that this situation was no longer tolerable, but their approach to resolving Luanda’s 
huge problems demonstrated the Angolan Government’s continued reliance on 
centralised, command-and-control approaches. In 2004, the President dismissed the 
Provincial Government and nominated a group of three officials (known as the 
troïka) to administer the capital. They were tasked with solving Luanda’s multiplicity 
of problems within a six-month mandate. This decision was highly controversial: 
though this commitment to decisive intervention was welcomed by many, these 
three officials were known to have an authoritarian governing style. After its 
mandate was renewed by another six months, the troïka was dissolved at the end of 
2004 and Luanda’s Provincial Government was re-established. The capital’s 
problems remain as complex and deeply rooted as ever. 
Despite this erratic approach to its governance, Luanda is changing. Major road 
works and construction of new residential areas are underway. However, there 
seems to be no clear urban policy. Recent violent evictions in musseques and the 
dismantling of street markets where informal traders operate seem to indicate that 
the vision underlying the current changes points to (re)building a modern city where 
the musseque is seen as marginal. The musseques are perceived by many Angolan 
policy makers and part of the elite as a temporary phenomenon whose huge growth 
 was due to the war and whose size will gradually decline with the return of war-
displaced people to their areas of origin, the development of the country and the 
growth of the modern city. However, the musseques continue to grow in the post-war 
period largely due to in-city migration and natural growth (Development Workshop 
2003).  
Collective action and participation spaces in Luanda’s Musseques 
Existing participation spaces  
Luanda’s musseques are generally heterogeneous, as their population has grown as a 
result of massive war-associated migration which at different moments involved 
people from a wide variety of regions in the country, including both rural and urban 
areas. Such heterogeneity combines with very harsh living conditions to hinder the 
establishment of extensive social networks (Robson and Roque 2001). In this 
environment, churches provide one of the important spaces where people can meet, 
socialise, be integrated into social networks and participate in organized activities for 
the benefit of the church or particular social groups.  
Small informal mutual aid groups also exist in the musseques. In most cases these 
groups are composed of friends or people who know each other very well. One of 
the most common types of group is known in Luanda as kixikila, where a system of 
reciprocal loaning and pooled savings brings together a few individuals. Many 
micro-finance systems set up by NGOs seek to draw upon social relationships 
constructed within these networks. At a slightly larger scale, some local organized 
groups have been promoted by national or international NGOs, frequently with a 
 view to helping to manage specific social services (water, schools, etc.). Very often, 
the vision put forward by NGOs for the creation of these groups also emphasises the 
strengthening of local institutions such as kixikila, and the promotion of local capacity 
for mutual aid.  
After the new Constitution of 1991 entrenched a right to freedom of association, 
numerous independent associations or micro-NGOs were created, many of them 
based in the musseques. Functioning principally as ‘non-profit social enterprises’ 
driven by ‘public service contracting’ (Sogge and Thaw 2003: 11), most of these 
organizations are highly dependent on external donor funding and do not in general 
claim to represent particular social groups. In the musseques, they are often headed by 
relatively well-educated men, many of whom were previously employed in the 
formal sector and often play a leadership role in their communities. However, little is 
known about the internal organizational practices of these organizations and their 
relationships with the communities with whom they work. 
Finally, the Comissões de Moradores (CM, literally ‘residents committees’) theoretically 
represent a participation space for musseque residents. Created by the government 
after Independence, CMs are supposed to represent the residents of a certain area in 
dealings with the local administration. In practice, CM members have often been 
appointed by local administrators with little or no consultation. In most cases, CM 
members perceive themselves, and are perceived by residents, as serving the 
interests of the administration. Their status and role in the neighbourhoods have 
nevertheless changed over time. They lost much of their controlling power with 
political liberalisation, and currently their role in the musseques is mostly related to 
 land use allocation and mediation of minor neighbourhood conflicts. However, their 
strong relationship with the administration continues, and in many cases they 
represent a resource on which the holders of political power can draw for 
mobilisation in the musseques, above all in the runup to elections. 
LUPP’s vision for mobilisation and participation spaces 
The Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP), which began in 1999, has projects 
located in musseques spread over four different municipalities: Kilamba Kiaxi, 
Cazenga, Sambizanga and Cacuaco. LUPP is one of the few development 
programmes working in Angolan peri-urban areas, as most of the NGOs and 
development agencies have concentrated their operations in rural zones, in line with 
the donors’ emphasis on relief and reconstruction work in those areas most directly 
affected by the war. While the programme initially prioritised poverty reduction 
through livelihoods support and development of infrastructure for service delivery, 
it has since 2003 changed its scope. Although LUPP continues working on 
livelihoods and service delivery, it increasingly seeks to draw upon its projects’ 
accumulated experience to influence policy and practice for urban development and 
poverty reduction in Luanda. In 2005, a review of the programme emphasised its 
increasing focus on ‘strategic goals of empowerment and good governance through 
participatory development’ (DFID 2005b: 3).  
In line with this change in emphasis, a significant share of LUPP’s effort has been 
channelled into fostering social organization in the musseques, and facilitating 
engagement between local organized groups and state institutions. LUPP has thus 
 become a key player in encouraging the emergence of a variety of local groupings 
and ‘new democratic spaces’ in the musseques. While many of these groups are 
intended to develop the capacity to provide and manage services for musseque 
residents, they are also expected to represent local communities in dealing with state 
institutions, to defend their rights and to promote broader social change towards a 
more equitable, democratic and tolerant society. By encouraging greater 
participation of musseque residents in the policy realm, LUPP has thus introduced a 
more political dimension to the programme’s action and given it a democracy-
building agenda, expressed in LUPP documents as emphasising ‘participatory 
governance’ and the promotion of ‘constructive engagement between government 
and civil society’ (Baskin 2003: 3). 
Participation in the musseques: two NGO-initiated experiences 
Among the groups and spaces created and/or supported by LUPP are local 
associations, alliances of local NGOs, organized community groups for delivery of 
services such as water, childcare and micro-finance, local groups for urban micro-
planning and municipal fora and councils for local development. Our analysis here 
focuses on two specific experiences: the process of federation of local Water 
Committees to create Associations of Water Committes (ACAs); and the process of 
social and political mobilisation in Kilamba Kiaxi Municipality that led to the 
constitution of the Kilamba Kiaxi Development Forum (KKDF). The KKDF 
represents one of the few experiences in Angola of a local municipal forum bringing 
together representatives of the administration, members of various local 
 organizations and individual residents. ACAs provide an example of a membership-
based organization engaging with the state on specific issues, while also sharing 
many of the features of local civic organizations such as those that take part in the 
KKDF.  
The Associations of Water Committees (ACAs)  
Water distribution is one of the areas on which LUPP has been focusing since it 
started, as access to water has been a source of great difficulty for residents in many 
of Luanda’s musseques. In order to improve water management LUPP has created 
Water Committees: neighbourhood-based organized groups with two members 
elected by local residents to manage water standposts. Their duties include 
organising water distribution and collecting payment for water from residents, 
keeping the area clean and carrying out maintenance of the standpost.  
In response to the difficulties experienced by the Water Committees in dealing with 
state institutions, in particular the Provincial Water Company (EPAL) and the local 
administration, LUPP and the most active members of the Water Committees 
decided to federate the committees in order to increase their negotiating power. Two 
Associations of Water Committees (ACAs) were then created with support from 
LUPP. These ACAs have been legally registered and have formal democratic 
structures and rules, including an elected leadership, an Executive Body and 
provision for regular general assemblies.  
However, ACAs have also been expected to take on functions that go beyond 
representation: they have been charged with monitoring and supervising the Water 
 Committees. As a result, ACAs’ Executive Bodies are now overseeing the whole 
process involved in local water distribution: they direct the establishment of new 
standposts, organize and lead the constitution of new Water Committees, monitor 
the functioning of the standposts, collect payments from the Water Committees and 
distribute the money between the different actors involved (Water Committees, 
ACAs, Local Administration and EPAL). In their representational role, ACAs have 
become the interface between Water Committees and the authorities: they have now 
been recognised by both the Local Administration and EPAL as the single 
interlocutor for water-related matters in their neighbourhoods.  
In addition, in line with LUPP’s civil society-building vision for locally organized 
groups, ACAs have been encouraged by the programme to become local 
development actors, receiving training in project design, leadership and 
management. ACAs themselves are also seeking to widen their remit beyond water-
related matters. They have begun to develop activities in other areas such as waste 
collection, health and civic education, and have developed project proposals to 
submit to other aid donors. ACAs have also joined NGO alliances facilitated by 
LUPP, and some of their members take part in discussions on urban development 
and policy at the local level. In reality, ACAs seem to be seeking to become what the 
members of their Executive Bodies perceive as ‘a local NGO’: a group of people with 
leadership capacity, with the desire to help bring about improvements in their 
neighbourhoods, and with the skills to adopt and use the discourse and 
methodological tools of the ‘development industry’ to access wider social contacts, 
training, funds and new livelihood opportunities.  
 Local organization in Kilamba Kiaxi: residents’ associations, local NGOs and the 
Kilamba Kiaxi Development Forum (KKDF) 
The beginnings of the KKDF 
The embryo of the Kilamba Kiaxi Development Forum was a Water and Sanitation 
Forum created by LUPP that included programme staff, EPAL and other 
organizations involved in water distribution in the municipality. However the 
Kilamba Kiaxi Municipal Administration did not take part in that forum. Wishing to 
move beyond water and sanitation issues and acknowledging the importance of the 
Municipal Government in local development, LUPP created the KKDF in 2001. The 
forum was intended by the Programme to provide a place where different social and 
development actors could meet to discuss, co-ordinate and integrate local 
development issues and activities as well as help to build a culture of engagement 
between the community and the government. Although the local administration was 
formally part of KKDF and the forum was jointly launched by LUPP and the 
administration, its initial participation was hesitant.  
According to LUPP’s vision during the initial stages of the process, it was important 
to organize Kilamba Kiaxi’s communities to contest the official vision for future 
urban development – one that excluded the musseques and their population. It was 
seen as necessary to organize local residents so that they could construct a common 
voice to deal with the authorities. This process centred on two major activities: the 
creation of area-based residents’ organizations and the enhancement of local NGOs’ 
role in the municipality. The attitude of the Kilamba Kiaxi Municipal Administration 
 reflected an Angolan tradition of state administration in which civil servants feel 
accountable above all to the higher levels of the state hierarchy and very little to 
those to whom they are supposed to provide services. There is also evidence that 
local administrators tend to avoid open dialogue with local residents for fear of being 
confronted with problems that they lack the technical capacity, the financial means 
or the political will to resolve. The country was also still at war in 2001 and the 
government did not trust independent political (or potentially political) initiatives.  
Organising local residents: the creation of ODAs 
The Area-Based Development Organizations (Organizações para o Desenvolvimento das 
Áreas, or ODAs) were created to articulate and represent what LUPP described as the 
‘genuine vision’ of the residents of a particular geographical area. As a result, they 
were purposefully constituted as parallel structures to the Comissões de Moradores. 
The CMs were seen as being primarily at the service of the administration and the 
MPLA and, consequently, as unaccountable to local residents. The constitution of 
ODAs was facilitated using LUPP’s own methodology and promoted at the initial 
stage the inclusion of different social groups within a specific geographical area 
(women, men, children, disabled people, etc.), who subsequently elected local 
leaders to form the ODAs. An ODA has an average of thirty members, two-thirds of 
whom are men. The members of the organization’s elected leadership body are 
intended to serve as the representatives of a specific geographical constituency, with 
the ability to present and defend their constituents’ vision and plan in fora such as 
the KKDF.  
 ODAs received training from LUPP that was especially oriented towards the 
organization of urban services. There are approximately 40 ODAs in Kilamba Kiaxi, 
twenty of which are considered to be active by LUPP. As intended by LUPP, the 
process for the creation of new ODAs was handed over to existing ODAs that had 
already been trained for this purpose: the expectation was that this process would 
generate a ‘local urban movement’. 
Reinforcing the role of local NGOs 
As in other neighbourhoods in Luanda, several local NGOs already existed in 
Kilamba Kiaxi Municipality. Many of these organizations were formally constituted 
as membership-based organizations, but in reality were barely active. As noted 
earlier, these organizations tend to function as social service contractors and are 
strongly dependent on donor funding. In line with its objective of enhancing local 
organizations’ role in the municipality, LUPP trained many of these NGOs in urban 
development issues and tools for development interventions (project design and 
management, gender analysis, etc.). These NGOs are often involved in the 
implementation of activities that have been prioritised by ODAs and funded by 
LUPP.  
In addition, following the same logic as with the Water Committees and ACAs, 
LUPP facilitated the creation of a local NGO Alliance in order to strengthen their 
voice when dealing with official authorities and reinforce their capacity for 
intervention in the municipality. As absence of independent financial resources 
constitutes a major obstacle to the continued existence of such organizations, LUPP 
 funded a small computer services centre to be managed by the Alliance, which was 
intended to generate resources for its activities.  
Local organizations and the KKDF today: building a stronger engagement with the 
state 
After almost four years of existence, the process of local organization and 
mobilisation in Kilamba Kiaxi has evolved. One of the major changes is the role 
currently played by the municipal administration. Although the municipal 
administration’s engagement with the forum was initially hesitant, the initiative 
mobilised a massive level of participation from the local population and 
organizations. The process also attracted a few prominent Angolan politicians 
belonging to the government and MPLA, who informally approved the initiative and 
gave it some external legitimacy. It is important to note that the formal presence of 
decentralisation on the Angolan policy agenda since 2000 gave room for these 
politicians to be openly supportive of the forum. LUPP’s attitude in relation to the 
municipal administration also changed, leading one of their managers to state that 
‘*while LUPP had+ focused considerable energies in building capacity through local 
NGOs and [ODAs] it soon became apparent that for an effective participatory 
process to take root strong local government intervention was required’ (Baskin 2003: 
7).  
Finally, with the end of the war in February 2002, the conditions were created for a 
rapprochement between local organizations and LUPP, on the one hand, and the 
municipal administration on the other. A stronger participation of the local 
 administration in the process gave greater legitimacy to the KKDF and reinforced its 
purpose of providing a space for engagement between Kilamba Kiaxi residents, their 
representatives and the municipal authorities. At the time, this was an innovative 
experience in a political environment where local authorities are not generally used 
to dialoguing with local residents.  
Currently, KKDF sessions are chaired by the Municipal Administrator. Discussions 
at the forum are based on issues brought in by local NGOs and residents’ 
representatives, in particular ODAs. The forum is also developing its organizational 
structure and becoming institutionalised: it has established two technical committees 
composed of members of the administration and leaders of local organizations such 
as the NGO Alliance and churches. These committees are still learning to engage 
with and propose solutions to complex urban management problems. They are also 
faced with a lack of financial support to implement their decisions. LUPP continues 
to play a major part in organising the forum and fostering the process in general.  
The KKDF is intended to provide the site for the production of a municipal 
development plan, but in the absence of financial resources to formulate it and 
implement recommendations, it continues to function principally as a discussion 
space rather than a decision-making body. A municipal fund, bringing together 
small grants from NGOs and other donors, has been created with a board including 
representatives of LUPP, the municipal administration and the ODAs. However 
these are still small-scale resources that do not include government funds held at the 
provincial level, and cannot fund the full implementation of a municipal 
development plan. Despite these limitations, the KKDF experience has become 
 widely-known, and it is credited with ensuring that Kilamba Kiaxi was selected to be 
one of the few municipalities to implement the Angolan municipal decentralisation 
pilot project currently being prepared by the government with UNDP and World 
Bank support.  
Participation and change: the expected and the unexpected 
From community development to democracy-building? 
LUPP’s founding objective was to ensure improved livelihoods and access to services 
for marginalised peri-urban communities in Luanda, and this has indeed been one of 
the major results of its activities. This has been achieved through a strategy involving 
the creation or reinforcement of local organizations. The emergence of ACAs, for 
example, has allowed LUPP to hand over the co-ordination of the different Water 
Committees and the supervision of their activities to a local collective actor, a process 
that has gone hand in hand with improved local water management. The activities of 
some ODAs have also generated improvements in service delivery: for example, the 
existence of an ODA in the local market has had a significant impact on the market’s 
rubbish collection and sanitation. The co-ordination through the KKDF of ODAs, 
NGOs and other local actors such as churches has also helped raise resources in the 
municipality to build and manage some new local schools.  
Beyond their immediate impacts on services, there is evidence that LUPP’s activities 
are also contributing to the broader democracy-building or ‘participatory 
governance’ agenda that the programme has come to espouse. Here, though, its 
impact is often manifested in unexpected ways. One example is the increasingly 
 visible presence in LUPP-created spaces of members of the CMs – institutions 
initially regarded by parts of the programme (notably the ODA-based mobilisation 
project in Kilamba Kiaxi) with suspicion and even hostility. That these spaces have 
come to be perceived as settings where meaningful things happen is signalled by the 
migration of CM members not only to the Water Committees and ACAs, but also to 
the ODAs, which initially set out to exclude them. The presence of CM members 
does not necessarily mean that ODAs and Water Committees have imported the 
hierarchical relationship that CMs have in relation to the local administration. There 
are signs that the CMs themselves are beginning to change, with some leaders 
acquiring a reputation as good representatives of residents’ views and demonstrating 
significant mobilisation power. A wider pattern seems to be emerging of leaders of 
the CMs trying to position themselves in a changing political environment.  
More broadly, the new spaces promoted by LUPP have provided opportunities for 
citizens to deliberate on issues of common concern, some of which are the focus of 
ongoing policy debate. As Robinson and Friedman point out, ‘even where they do 
not exert policy influence, the role of civil society in providing citizens with an 
independent sphere of association in which they can participate and deliberate 
priorities is an important democratic function in its own right’ (2005: 29). It may be 
ACAs’ leaders rather than their members who enjoy greater proximity to state 
institutions, but previously this open access to information and opportunity for 
influence was available to no citizens at all. KKDF meetings may fall short of the 
ideal of deliberative democracy – women are present but largely silent, discussions 
are dominated by the leaders of better-established organizations and there are no 
 mechanisms to ensure that the decisions taken are actually implemented – but the 
forum nevertheless provides a space where a larger number and much greater 
diversity of people can gain a voice in the definition of local priorities than was the 
case with any pre-existing institution.  
Towards broader institutional change? 
For the KKDF, however, if financial resources are not available for the design of a full 
Municipal Development Plan and the implementation of activities that result in clear 
improvements in Kilamba Kiaxi, there is a risk that the forum will lead to frustration, 
disenchantment and demobilisation. Much depends on the future of the 
decentralisation project for which Kilamba Kiaxi has been selected as a pilot site. 
However, the future of the decentralisation process remains unclear and there are no 
indications that it will move forward before the elections in 2006. A recent World 
Bank document notes that, despite some promising signs, ‘there are many challenges 
ahead to ensure that a sound institutional basis as well as an effective fiscal 
framework and legislation exist for decentralization and local development’ (World 
Bank 2004: 5). The extent to which Kilamba Kiaxi can serve as a model for other 
municipalities in Angola depends, in turn, on whether and how the pilot project will 
feed into the nation-wide decentralisation process.8 
The contradictions and impasses created by the stalling of the national 
decentralisation process are evident in other ways in Kilamba Kiaxi. In particular, the 
lack of clarity over the emerging rules of the game has provided scope for more 
explicit divergence between the visions of LUPP and the municipal administration 
 over the KKDF’s future institutional role. While LUPP expects the forum to provide a 
space for construction of ‘a shared vision and consensus with regard to future 
growth’ (Baskins 2003: 9) and a potential site for construction of a participatory 
Municipal Development Plan, at a forum meeting held in June 2005 the municipal 
administrator identified the KKDF as the place to discuss ‘micro issues’ and 
‘community problems’, whereas ‘macro issues of the municipality’ were to be 
discussed in the Municipal Council. As defined in the Angolan legislation, Municipal 
Councils are classic ‘invited spaces’: they are meetings of the Municipal Government 
which may be attended by specific individuals and organizations at the invitation of 
the Administrator ‘when he judges this to be necessary’ (República de Angola 1999). 
Without the legitimacy of a decentralisation policy framework which endorses the 
forum model, there is thus the risk that the KKDF will be seen as a space to discuss 
what may be perceived as ‘minor issues’ – such as waste collection or neighbourhood 
security – while ‘important projects’ requiring significant investment are discussed in 
the Municipal Council. 
Changing state-citizen relations? 
In Kilamba Kiaxi, although political support from the local administrator does 
currently exist, the lack of financial resources and a legal framework to give 
legitimacy to the process and establish new rules and procedures has resulted in an 
absence of incentives for civil servants in the local administration to change their 
attitudes and behaviour. LUPP staff describe a wide gap between the expectations of 
local organizations and residents who (partly as a result of training and support from 
the programme) demand more participatory and responsive governance, and the 
 response from local administration officials. The quality of service delivery in the 
administration remains little improved, and officials largely continue to maintain the 
same unaccountable and sometimes dismissive treatment of local residents.  
Pressure for change may, however, be emerging from below. In addition to their role 
in improving service delivery, the variety of organizations created or encouraged by 
LUPP have also provided a wide range of social spaces where people can meet and 
discuss matters relating to their neighbourhood, in a context where such spaces were 
previously almost non-existent. This seems, in turn, to be contributing to a (still 
tentative but nonetheless significant) growth of autonomous action by citizens 
seeking to claim their rights, with members of LUPP-supported groups approaching 
local authorities to complain of abusive behaviour by officials or question decisions 
that harm their livelihoods, such as market closures. 
New leaders and new forms of leadership? 
These new local organizational structures have also allowed for the mushrooming of 
a range of new leaders in the musseques: a set of people who have initiative, who wish 
to take on responsibilities and to be active in the public sphere. Most of the leaders of 
the NGO Alliances, ACAs and ODAs are men, belong to the relatively privileged 
musseque middle-class, are reasonably well-educated and have some command of 
‘policy speak’. Many were already perceived as leaders in their communities. What 
these new organizational structures have provided is a public sphere where they can 
express themselves and extend their influence beyond their own immediate 
localities.  
 While the strengthening of leadership can be an extremely valuable asset in building 
local organizations, the impact on broader processes of democratisation depends on 
the quality of this leadership. Authoritarian leadership styles are not likely to ensure 
that organizations express the views of their constituents. Many of the organizations 
promoted by LUPP are membership-based organizations with the potential to 
express the voice of a significant number of people and thereby to play an important 
role in the democratisation of political life. A key element in fulfilling this role 
involves developing internal democratic practices (Robinson and Friedman 2005), 
including robust accountability mechanisms – especially in a country such as Angola, 
with its long history of leadership models portraying people in power as bearers of 
rights without obligations.  
Internal accountability mechanisms are not always strong in LUPP-supported 
groups. The different functions assumed by the ACAs, for example, seem to be 
generating contradictions in their relationship with their constituencies. ACAs are 
formally accountable to a General Assembly of the Water Committees they represent, 
whose members are in turn accountable to the local residents of specific areas and 
are subject to re-election every year. However, ACAs are also expected to supervise 
the Water Committees, inverting their accountability relations. In practice, 
Committees and their membership base have little power to hold ACAs accountable, 
as is evidenced by one ACA’s expressed intention to retain Water Committee 
representatives who had been voted out by their own neighbourhood assemblies. 
This decision appears to have been motivated by the desire to become a consolidated 
organization, with a stable membership.  
 New directions for local organizations? 
The incident described above reflects an apparent mutation in ACAs’ missions, from 
‘representative associations’ to ‘local NGOs’ whose primary function is service 
delivery in a wide range of sectors. This requires ACAs to become independent from 
their membership base, breaking the chain of accountability initially established to 
support their representative function and placing in question the legitimacy of their 
supervisory function. The scope for such ‘mutations’ derives both from the new and 
experimental nature of the structures promoted by LUPP and from the wider lack of 
clarity on organizational models and political/institutional rules of the game that 
characterises Angola’s confused and hesitant democratic transition. While this may 
lead local organizations away from the institutional roles originally envisaged for 
them, it demonstrates the importance of the agency exercised by such grassroots 
groups as they pursue evolving agendas and respond to the opportunities and 
constraints presented by the context in which they are operating. 
Mutation into a ‘non-profit social enterprise’ type of organization is a path that may 
be chosen by many membership-based organizations – including structures such as 
ODAs – in a social context like Angola’s where livelihood opportunities for people 
living in the musseques are scarce and working on service delivery combines 
contributing to the community and gaining political capital with the possibility of 
generating an income. While this type of organization can undoubtedly make a 
positive contribution to their communities, their political role in building democracy 
in Angola will depend on the extent to which their activities are grounded on strong 
 internal democratic practices – and the scope for establishing alternative mechanisms 
to fulfil the representative roles which they may be leaving behind. 
Lessons and implications 
The literature on empowered participatory governance assumes that while contexts 
may be favourable or unfavourable, they are largely static. The rules of the political 
game have already crystallised, and changes arise from the emergence of new actors 
(Left political parties, social movements) rather than any fluidity or indefinition in 
the system itself. In countries immersed in the messy transitions that characterise 
most post-authoritarian and/or post-conflict settings, this assumption does not apply. 
This makes it all the more important to avoid generalisations and seek to understand 
the specific social and political dynamics of transitional contexts and their 
implications for emerging ‘new democratic spaces’. As a recent review of post-
conflict governance interventions notes, ‘understanding, and intervening in, the 
dynamics of states where all is not well, where the social and institutional fabric has 
been shredded and violence has erupted, call for a careful combination of the general 
(and generalisable) and the situation-specific’ (Brinkerhoff 2005: 12). 
Angola is currently engaged in just such a complex transition, characterised by the 
coexistence of authoritarian political practice and a command-and-control 
bureaucracy with a formally democratic institutional framework, and of a heavily 
centralised political culture with the emergence of a host of new local political actors 
and spaces. The evidence from Luanda suggests that contexts where the political and 
institutional rules are unclear, inappropriate, or both encourage new actors and 
 spaces to mutate as they develop. This may occasionally have negative consequences 
– such as the hijacking of plural spaces by narrow interests or the reproduction of 
authoritarian leadership styles – but it also permits adaptation that enables these 
structures to respond to the demands and opportunities of their particular contexts 
in ways which may be more effective than pre-programmed models. The shifting 
roles that accompany such processes of adaptation may be confusing and sometimes 
contradictory, but they are also part of a vitally necessary process of democratic 
experimentation. The outcomes of this process will be crucially determined by the 
agency of a multiplicity of actors – often operating at cross-purposes – at both the 
policy and grassroots levels. The dominant post-conflict peacebuilding discourse 
assumes a neatly sequential model of top-down transformation, in which micro-level 
democratisation is relegated to the final stage. The evidence from Luanda suggests 
that while consolidating an enabling macro framework (whether for decentralisation 
or for elections) is essential, in practice democratisation does not wait for this 
framework to be in place. Instead, whatever emerging spaces exist will provide an 
outlet for long-repressed political energy. With this in mind, we argue for 
recognition of the reality that establishing rules that are both locally appropriate and 
politically legitimate will necessarily require a long and messy period of negotiation 
between old and emerging actors in both old and emerging spaces. Establishing links 
between local experimentation in ‘new democratic spaces’ and macro-level processes 
of political change is a fundamental element in ensuring that such messy transitions 
are ultimately meaningful and successful. 
 NGOs, as sponsors of new spaces and providers of resources that new actors can use 
to build a social and political base, potentially play a key role in this process. Given 
the relative significance of their inputs in a very resource-scarce context, NGO 
projects such as those discussed in this chapter are de facto governance interventions 
whether or not they play explicit attention to the nature of relationships with the 
state and the political process. NGOs’ approach to mobilisation and institutional 
design therefore needs to move beyond conventional concerns, and begin to focus on 
the wider political effects of interventions as much as on their immediate poverty-
reduction impact. Our suggestion is that a key starting-point for this process is an 
emphasis on the role of accountability in new structures. Whether in holding the 
state and other powerful actors (including NGOs themselves) to account, or in 
developing more transparent and accountable leadership practices within the 
institutions themselves, this will help to bridge the gap between ad hoc, project-
based interventions and wider processes of social and political democratisation. 
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1 This chapter is based on the authors’ work in Angola and elsewhere over a number of years, but 
draws specifically on a series of consultancy studies carried out between September 2003 and 
December 2004 for the Luanda Urban Poverty Programme (LUPP), a joint initiative of Save the 
Children UK (SCUK), CARE and Development Workshop (DW) in partnership with One World 
Action (OWA), funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID). We are 
very grateful to everyone from the communities and the project teams who contributed their 
reflections, and to LUPP and DFID for their permission to use the material on which part of this 
chapter draws. In particular we would like to thank Kate Ashton, Allan Cain, Ken Caplan, Susan 
Grant, Katja Jobes, Martin Johnston, Daniel Miji, Fernando Pacheco and our Citizenship DRC 
‘Spaces for Change’ group colleagues for thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
2 Angola is currently the second largest oil producer in Africa (after Nigeria), with a production 
of 900,000 barrels per day (expected to reach 2.2 million barrels by 2008); in 2000 the country 
accounted for fifteen percent of the world’s diamond production (Hodges 2004). However, the 
country’s estimated life expectancy at birth is seven percent below the average for Sub-Saharan 
African countries and its estimated adult illiteracy rate is 50.6 percent higher (República de 
Angola 2003). 
3 This is the case, for example, with the literature on unfavourable contextual factors and enabling 
conditions in Brazil, discussed in Coelho et al. 2002. 
4 Attempts to form a national unity government were abandoned after the failure of peace 
accords during the 1990s, while local, parliamentary and presidential elections have been 
repeatedly postponed and are now due to take place in 2006 (see below). 
                                                                                                                                                               
5 Angola was at war with apartheid South Africa until 1990. 
6 These were mainly divided along the three principal liberation movements: MPLA, 
UNITA and FNLA (Frente Nacional para a Libertação de Angola)..  
7 The authors would like to thank Fernando Pacheco for his insights into the decentralisation 
process in Angola. 
8 LUPP has recognised the importance of this issue, and is currently seeking to implement an 
influencing strategy which links its micro-level interventions with broader policy debates. 
